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I. INTRODUCTION
Gabriel Wilner, in whose honored memory this article is written, asked
me many years ago to contribute to the Brussels Seminar. The subject was
Community Social Law, including free movement of workers. Gabriel
would occasionally sit in on my lectures. Sometimes he would comment,
sometimes he was content to listen, with that familiar look of intent
benevolence which others will also remember with affection, and is captured
in certain photographs which happily bring him back, for a moment.
One of the cases I referred to in my lectures was Public Prosecutor v.
Mutsch (Mutsch),1 which illustrates how far the principle of nondiscrimination can—or can’t—take you. Mutsch was about a Belgian
procedural rule whose origins go back to the 1930s, a time when Belgium
was trying to consolidate its links with its then newly-acquired Germanspeaking region, which was transferred from Germany following a plebiscite
after the First World War.2 Stated briefly, the rule was that Germanspeaking inhabitants of this area could use German in certain local criminal
courts, even if that court’s usual language was French.3 The rule could only
be invoked by Belgians; at that time, the Belgians understandably had no
intention of allowing it to be used by anyone else. Many years later, with the
European Community in place, including its rules about migrant workers, a
Luxembourg resident in this Belgian region was charged with a minor
offense in one of these courts.4 He invoked the rule, but its application was
stayed by the Cour d’Appel, Liège (Court of Appeals, Liège), since, even
though he met the residence condition, he was not Belgian.5 A preliminary
question was referred to the European Court of Justice (ECJ or the Court),
which ruled that this restriction on migrant workers was not permissible
under Article 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68, which provides that all
Community workers are to enjoy the same “social advantages” in the host

1

Case 137/84, Ministère Pub. v. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681.
See Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran, The “Requirement” of Plebiscite in Territorial
Rapprochement, 12 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 23, 28–29 (1989) (“[N]eutral and Prussian Moresnet,
which had a predominantly German population, was ceded to Belgium . . . .”).
3
Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681, para. 3. For the modern application of the Law of 15 June
1935 on the use of languages in the courts, see Jean Laenens & George Van Mellaert, The
Judicial System and Procedure 93–94, in INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW (Hubert Bocken &
Walter de Bondt eds., 2001).
4
Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681, para. 2.
5
Id. paras. 4–5.
2
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state as national workers.6 While the expression “social advantages” was
clearly intended to refer primarily to social security benefits, the Court
interpreted it broadly, as referring to measures which could facilitate the
exercise of the right of free movement, thus including procedural rules in
criminal courts which were available to national workers.7 Therefore, even
though there was no Community “competence” (i.e., no power to regulate) in
respect of national criminal procedure, the Community rule forbidding
discrimination against migrant workers applied.
On the other hand, Mutsch does not mean that any migrant worker can
use his own language in the host state’s courts, whatever that language may
be. An Italian migrant worker in Belgium cannot use Italian in a Belgian
court, since a Belgian cannot use Italian in that court either. The Mutsch
judgment only means that if a national worker living in a state (or
jurisdiction) can use a particular language in its courts (or some of them), the
migrant worker living in that state (or jurisdiction) can also use that
particular language in its courts (or those particular courts).
This case intrigued Gabriel—an excellent linguist himself—and it is in
memory of the interest he showed in it, and of the kindness he did me in
asking me to contribute to his Brussels project, that I have chosen the subject
of official languages for this Article. It is a matter of some contemporary
interest: on the one hand, the number of official languages has more than
doubled (from 11 to 23) since 2004, with the recent enlargements of the
Community. On the other hand, the issue of official languages, and when the
institutions can or must use particular languages, has been the subject of a
large and increasing number of judgments in the last few years.
II. TREATY PROVISIONS ON LANGUAGES
Languages are an inescapable part of European Union affairs. While the
European Coal & Steel Community Treaty of 1951 was only authentic in
French,8 the Official Journal of the European Coal and Steel Community was
6

Id. paras. 15–18.
Id.; see also Annette Schrauwen, Essay, Sink or Swim Together? Developments in
European Citizenship, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 778, 791 (2000) (“An argument against free
movement without financial guarantees was the lack of harmonization of social security
systems and the wish to avoid ‘benefits tourism.’ ”).
8
Compare Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community art. 100, Apr. 18,
1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (stating that it was “drawn up in a single original,” and make no
reference to which language was authentic), with Consolidated Version of the Treaty on
European Union art. 53, Mar. 3, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 13 [hereinafter TEU]; TEU art. 55
7
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also published in German, Italian, and Dutch. ECJ cases could be heard in
any of the four languages, but of course these cases only concerned a few
large coal and steel producers.9 However, things changed by 1957, when the
European Economic Community and Euratom Treaties were signed—the
former of which potentially applied to all economic operators, workers as
much as employers.10 These 1957 Treaties and their successors are all
authentic in all the official Union languages declared as such by the Member
States. The matter is still governed by Regulation 1 of 1958 (Regulation
1/58), as amended.11 It is important to emphasize the word official, which is
used in Regulation 1/58. It is for each Member State to determine what
language or languages are official in its territory or part of its territory.12
Likewise, it is for each Member State to declare to the Union which language
or languages are to be regarded as official for Union purposes, in dealings
with that State and its residents. A language may be official throughout the
territory of a Member State but not be an official Union language, because
that Member State has not declared it official for this purpose.13 The same
goes for regional languages in a Member State: even if they enjoy official
recognition in a given region, these regional languages are not Union
languages, even for the areas which the language in question is internally
(“This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English,
Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and Swedish languages,
the texts in each of these languages being equally authentic.”), and Consolidated Version of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 358, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C
83) 47 [hereinafter TFEU] (applying art. 55 of the TEU).
9
D.G. VALENTINE, THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY
147, 181–92 (1955).
10
EUROPEAN UNION LAW: TEXT AND MATERIALS 509 (Damien Chalmers et al. eds., 2008).
11
Council Regulation 1/58, Languages to be Used by the European Economic Community,
Oct. 6, 1958, 1958 O.J. (17) 385 [hereinafter Regulation 1/58].
12
See id. art. 8 (“If a Member State has more than one official language, the language to be
used shall, at the request of such State, be governed by the general rules of its law.”).
13
For example, Turkish is not presently a Union language (see Official EU Languages,
EUROPA, http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/languages-of-europe/doc135en.htm (last
updated Aug. 8, 2011)), even though it is an official language in Cyprus (see Languages
Across Europe: Cyprus, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/languages/European_languages/country
es/Cyprus.shtml (last visited Aug. 20, 2011)). Cyprus did not, however, declare Turkish an
official Union language in respect of Cyprus when it acceded in 2004. This conflict is the
background to Case T-455/04, Beyatli v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. I-0000, aff’d, Case C-238/07
P, Beyatli v. Comm’n 2007 E.C.R. I-140, which concerned Turkish Cypriots who challenged
the fact that they could not choose Turkish as their primary language in a recruitment
competition. However, the substantive issue was not decided, as the case was held
inadmissible.
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official, if they have not been so declared to the Union by that Member
State.14 This rule is true even if the language concerned is an official Union
language in another Member State.15
Paragraph (1) of Article 55 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), as
amended, lists the languages in which the TEU is authentic:
This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Bulgarian,
Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French,
German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian,
Spanish and Swedish languages, the texts in each of these
languages being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the
archives of the Government of the Italian Republic, which will
transmit a certified copy to each of the governments of the
other signatory States.16
Paragraph (2) of Article 55 concerns what are sometimes called the
“additional” languages which, as we shall see, are not declared official Union
languages under Regulation 1/58.17
This Treaty may also be translated into any other languages as
determined by Member States among those which, in
accordance with their constitutional order, enjoy official status
in all or part of their territory. A certified copy of such
14

NIAMH NIC SHUIBHNE, EC LAW AND MINORITY LANGUAGE POLICY 6 (2007). Article 2 of
Regulation 1/58, refers only to the right of a correspondent to address the institutions in any of
the official languages, which are those listed in Article 1 of Regulation 1/58, not to “working”
or “additional” languages. Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, arts. 1–2.
15
Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 3. Thus, Member State A may internally recognize
not only its national language X, but also language Y, in respect of region Z which forms part
of A’s territory. However, if state A has only declared language X to be an official Union
language in respect of itself, the consequence is that an institution may not address an official
act to state A in any language other than X. Nor may the institution use language Y even to
address such an act to a citizen of A, who lives in region Z and uses language Y. That is so
even if language Y happens to be an official Union language (for example, because it has been
so declared by Member State B). The contrary would apply only if state A has declared
language Y to be an official Union language in respect of itself, or the relevant part of its
territory.
16
TEU art. 55.
17
See Council Conclusion, Official Use of Additional Languages, 2005 O.J. (C 148) 1
(referring to the languages not mentioned as “official languages” in Regulation 1/58 as
“additional languages”).
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translations shall be provided by the Member States concerned
to be deposited in the archives of the Council.18
Article 20 paragraph (2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (TFEU) provides:
Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to
the duties provided for in [the TEU and the TFEU]. They shall
have, inter alia: . . . (d) the right to petition the European
Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to
address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any
of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same
language.19
Further, per Article 24 of the TFEU, “[e]very citizen of the Union may write
to any of the institutions or bodies referred to in this Article or in Article 13
of the [TEU] in one of the languages mentioned in Article 55(1) of the
[TEU] and have an answer in the same language.”20
Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
(CFR) provides: “[a]ny discrimination based on any ground such as sex,
race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, language, religion or
belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority,
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”21
Article 41(4) of the CFR, on a citizen’s right to good administration, is
similar to the TFEU’s Article 24: “Every person may write to the institutions
of the Union in one of the languages of the [TEU and the TFEU] and must
have an answer in the same language.”22
The European Union recently adopted a general principle of protecting
linguistic diversity in Article 22 of the CFR which states that “[t]he Union
shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”23 The last paragraph
of Article 3(3) of the TEU provides the same effect: “[The European Union]
shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that
18

TEU art. 55.
TFEU art. 20.
20
Id. art. 24 (emphasis added).
21
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 21, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J.
(C 83) 389 [hereinafter CFR] (emphasis added).
22
Id. art. 41(4) (emphasis added).
23
Id. art. 22 (emphasis added).
19
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Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”24 Linguistic
diversity is also referred to in Articles 165 and 207 of the TFEU, concerning
the European Union’s contribution to education policy and international
agreements on trade in cultural goods, respectively.25 Article 4(2) of the
TEU, which could be taken as a reference to linguistic equality, provides that
“[t]he [European] Union shall respect the equality of Member States before
the [TEU and the TFEU] as well as their national identities.”26
However, neither Article 3(3) nor Article 4(2) of the TEU is relevant to
the question of what languages are official. Indeed, nothing in the TEU and
the TFEU themselves determines that matter. While they contain provisions
stating in which languages they are authentic, that is not the same thing as
stating what languages are official for purposes of secondary legislation.27 In
fact, these two treaties leave it to the Council to decide, without imposing
any limitations on its choices.28
The role of the Council in relation to official languages reveals how the
sensitivity of the official language issue can affect many matters, even an
essential economic issue such as the creation of Union intellectual property
rights:
In the context of the establishment and functioning of the
internal market, the European Parliament and the Council,
acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure,
shall establish measures for the creation of European
intellectual property rights to provide uniform protection of
intellectual property rights throughout the Union and for the
setting up of centralised Union-wide authorisation,
coordination and supervision arrangements.
The Council, acting in accordance with a special legislative
procedure, shall by means of regulations establish language
arrangements for the European intellectual property rights. The

24

TEU art. 3(3).
TFEU arts. 165, 207.
26
TEU art. 4(2).
27
Irish was not declared an official language by Ireland in 1973 for the purposes of
Regulation 1/58, but the Treaties have always been authentic in Irish.
28
TFEU art. 342 (“The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Union shall,
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Union, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously by means of regulations.”
(emphasis added)).
25
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Council shall act unanimously after consulting the European
Parliament.29
Thus a distinction is made between creating the substantive intellectual
property regime itself (which only requires the ordinary legislative
procedure—Parliament plus Council, the latter normally acting by qualified
majority) and creating the linguistic rules of the regime (which requires
unanimity, and the Parliament is merely consulted).30 The existence of this
separate legal basis for a language regime in a specialized context implies that
the Council can adopt a regime for this purpose which differs from the general
regime under Article 342, for example by adopting a regime using only some
of the languages recognized as official under Regulation 1/58.31 Indeed, this
has already been done for Union trademarks, where a regime of only five
official languages (English, French, German, Italian and Spanish) has been
created; this is the background to the Kik32 case discussed in Part IV.
The Commission made a proposal in 2000 for a Community patent.33
Given that there already exists an autonomous (non-Community) European
patent system run by the European Patent Office in Munich, which operates
in three languages only (English, French and German),34 the Commission
likewise proposed a three-language system for the Community patent.35 This
proposal encountered the implacable opposition of some Member States
(principally Italy and Spain).36 It is mainly for this reason that the proposal
29

Id. art. 118 (emphasis added).
Compare id. art. 294, with id. art. 188.
31
See id. art. 342 (providing that the Council determines the rules governing languages).
32
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-361/01 P, Kik v. Office for Harmonisation
in the Internal Market (OHIM), 2003 E.C.R. I-08283.
33
Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Community Patent, COM (2000)
412 final (July 5, 2000) [hereinafter Community Patent Proposal].
34
Convention on the Grant of European Patents art. 14(1), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199
[hereinafter European Patent Convention].
35
See Community Patent Proposal, supra note 33, at sec. 2.4.3.1 (referencing the “office’s
three working languages”). See also Seth Cannon, Note, Achieving the Benefits of a
Centralized Community Patent System at Minimal Cost, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 415, 425
(2003) (“Under this proposal, the inventor must translate the entire patent into one of the
[European Patent Office] languages (i.e., English, French, and German) . . . .”).
36
See, e.g., Xavier Buffet-Delmas & Laura Morelli, Modifications to the European Patent
System, 20 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 18, 22 (2008) (indicating the disagreement among
Member States and the lack of a Community Patent System to date); Judit Zegnal, Talks
Continue over EU-wide Patenting, NEW WORLD PUB., Aug. 22, 2005, NEW WORLD PUBL’G
(citing the “lack of agreement [on Community patent proposal issues] such as how to treat
patent infringements which might arise as a result of mistranslations”).
30
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has still not been adopted, more than ten years later.37 The patent system
may now become one of the first examples of “enhanced cooperation,” a new
procedure under Article 20(2) of the TEU and Article 329 of the TFEU
which allow those Member States that support a proposed measure to adopt
it amongst themselves (if there are at least nine states) when the required
majority cannot be found for a normal legislative act.38
III. REGULATION 1/58 AND LANGUAGE PRACTICES IN THE INSTITUTIONS
Turning to the content of Regulation 1/58, it can be summarized by
saying that it provides for two language regimes—one external and one
internal. The external regime reflects the treaty provisions quoted above and
is set out in Articles 1 through 5. Regulation 1/58 originally provided for
four official languages (Dutch, French, German, and Italian). As amended
following successive enlargements, Articles 1 through 5 now read:
Article 1
The official languages and the working languages of the
institutions of the Community shall be Bulgarian, Czech,
Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German,
Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese,
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Spanish and
Swedish.39

37

See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 35, at 415 (“After more than 25 years of discussion, the
European Community [ ] has not reached complete agreement on a proposed Community
patent system which would create a ‘unified’ patent effective throughout the European
Union[ ].”); Timo Minssen, Meanwhile on the Other Side of the Pond: Why
Biopharmaceutical Inventions That Were “Obvious to Try” Still Might Be Non-Obvious—
Part I, 9 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 60, 69 n.30 (2010) (“Although a Community patent
system has been debated for many years, there is still no [Community] patent available.”).
38
TEU art. 20(2); TFEU art. 329(1).
39
Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 1, most recently amended by Council Regulation (EC)
No. 1791/2006 of November 20, 2006, O.J. (L 363) 1, 12.20.2006), consolidated text at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CONSLEG:1958R0001:20070101:EN:
PDF.
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Article 2
Documents which a Member State or a person subject to the
jurisdiction of a Member State sends to institutions of the
Community may be drafted in any one of the official languages
selected by the sender. The reply shall be drafted in the same
language.40
Article 3
Documents which an institution of the Community sends to a
Member State or to a person subject to the jurisdiction of a
Member State shall be drafted in the language of such State.41
Article 4
Regulations and other documents of general application shall
be drafted in the [four] official languages.42
Article 5
The Official Journal of the Community shall be published in
the [23] official languages.43
The requirements set forth in Articles 1 through 5 are strict. The ECJ
recently held, for example, that a Community regulation—an act which by its
nature is “directly applicable in all Member States” and can bind individuals
in those states44—cannot be enforced against a citizen in the courts of a
40

Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 2 (reflecting TFEU art. 20, 24 and CFR art. 41(4)).
See supra Part II. In fact, it was Article 2 of Regulation 1/58 that came first, and these newer
Treaty provisions have simply confirmed the established principle at a higher level in the
hierarchy of norms. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30(3), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 (“When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to
the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under
article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with
those of the latter treaty.”).
41
Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 3.
42
Id. art. 4.
43
Id. art. 5 (emphasis added).
44
TFEU art. 288.
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Member State if it has not yet been published in the Official Journal of the
European Union (Official Journal) in the language concerned.45 Under
Article 297 of the TFEU, publication is a condition of the validity of a
regulation.46
The internal regime is not explicitly referred to in the TEU and the
TFEU—it is more relaxed. Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 provides that “[t]he
institutions of the Community may stipulate in their rules of procedure which
of the languages are to be used in specific cases.”47 However, the institutions
have not made full use of this provision. For example, there is nothing about
internal working languages in the Commission’s Rules of Procedure,48
although there is an indirect reference to such a possibility in the provisions
implementing those rules.49 Of course, the internal workings of a relatively
small body of appointed people (twenty-seven), whose meetings are not
public, are different from those of an elected body of over 700 members,
such as the Parliament, which meets in public session.50 Similarly, the
factual linguistic position for a person appointed to a Union mandate for
several years, such as members of the Commission, is also different from the
position of someone who attends meetings as a member of the Council
intermittently as part of the job of being a national minister and for whom

45

See Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux sro v. Celní ředitelství Olomouc, 2007 E.C.R. I-10841
(regarding enforceability where there was no translation into the language of a Member State).
46
TFEU art. 297(1).
47
Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 6 (emphasis added).
48
EC Rules of Procedure of the Commission (EC) C (2000) 3614, 2000 O.J. (L 308) 26
[hereinafter EC Rules of Procedure].
49
Commission Decision 138/10, amending its Rules of Procedure, art. 17, 2010 O.J. (L 55)
60 (EU) (referencing “the authentic language or languages” of the Commission). The
implementing rules provide that the documents to be considered at the Commission’s
meetings are to be communicated to the Members in the language determined by the President
(and also in the language(s) appropriate to the act concerned, taking account of any
requirements as to publication and as to the languages to be used in relation to any addressee).
Id. art. 17. However, while no decision has been taken by the President concerning any such
“internal” languages, this has not prevented a long-standing informal practice from arising,
according to which, documents for the College of Commissioners are provided in English,
French, and German. See Jacqueline Mowbray, Language in the UN and EU: Linguistic
Diversity As a Challenge for Multilateralism, 8 N.Z. J. PUB. & INT’L L. 91, 98 (2010) (“[The]
EU function[s] in a limited number of official languages, and with an even more limited
number of de facto working languages. . . . [I]t seems that, in practice, offices within these
organisations [sic] effectively function in one or two languages only.”).
50
European Parliament Rules of Procedure, 16th ed., Rule 96(2), 2005 O.J. (L 44) 1
[hereinafter EP Rules of Procedure] (“Debates in Parliament shall be public.”).
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knowledge of languages, or the ability to learn them, is not necessarily a part
of that job.51
As will be seen, the Council and the Parliament do refer to languages in
their rules, but only to repeat, in substance, the rules of Regulation 1/58.
None of this is surprising, since it is clearly a delicate matter for an
institution bound by principles, such as those laid down in the Treaty
provisions just quoted, to take a formal stance which might be interpreted as
meaning that some official languages were more “important” than others.52
On the other hand, and just as unsurprisingly, most institutions have certain
internal practices on this matter, whose existence is clearly recorded in the
case-law.53 This is not the place for an exhaustive account of those practices,
but it may be useful to give some general indications.
The Council’s internal rules provide, in relation to the Council itself, that
it only deliberates and decides on the basis of texts in conformity with the
language rules in force (i.e., Regulation 1/58), subject to exceptions in urgent
cases if unanimously agreed.54 However, working groups and the Committee
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which do the preparatory work,
have a pragmatic regime; COREPER operates only in English, French, and
German,55 and some groups only in English and French. The Parliament’s
Rules of Procedure provide that all its documents are to be drafted in all the
official languages and that any member may speak in any official language
of his or her choice, and that interpretation will be provided into all the other

51
See Mowbray, supra note 49, at 101 (“While major decision-making within [EU]
institutions takes place at the intergovernmental level, the daily decision-making and work of
these organisations is carried out by their employees. As a result, language requirements for
appointment dramatically influence who is able to participate.”).
52
See Jonathan Yim, Case Note, Feasibility of the Language Policy of the European Union,
41 INT’L LAW. 127, 132–33 (2007) (noting that the EU multilingual regime has been described
as “politically explosive” and “highly sensitive”).
53
See Stella Burch Elias, Regional Minorities, Immigrants and Migrants: The Reframing of
Minority Language Rights in Europe, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 261, 297–99 (2010) (finding
that the ECJ is disassociating linguistic rights with membership in particular linguistic groups
and rather applying it to all individuals).
54
Council Decision 2009/937, Adopting the Council’s Rules of Procedure, art. 14(1), O.J.
(L 325) 44 (EU); Regulation 1/58, supra note 11.
55
See Coreper Paves the Way for Political Harmony, EUR. VOICE (May 2, 1996), http://
www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/coreper-paves-the-way-for-political-harmony/31173.
aspx (noting the “unwritten requirement for Coreper membership is proficiency in either English,
French or German”).
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official languages.56 Applying this regime apparently accounts annually for
more than a third of the Parliament’s running costs, with over 1,000,000
pages translated per year.57 The Parliament has virtually no simplified
internal language rules amongst its members. On the other hand,
Parliament’s permanent officials tend to use a limited range of languages
amongst themselves, for internal communication, essentially French and
English.
The language situation is different in the Commission, given its more
administrative character. The European Commission’s Rules of Procedure
are silent on languages so that, formally speaking, Regulation 1/58 applies.58
Indeed it is that strict regime which applies in the Commission’s external
dealings. Moreover, it is even possible for citizens to deal with the
Commission in the “additional” languages enjoying official status in Spain.59
On the other hand, in its role as instigator of legislation, the Commission
must prepare reports, proposals, or other documents, which must be drafted
internally in a given language. It is apparent from the Commission’s
translation statistics that only two languages (French and English) are
generally used for drafting texts.60
The ECJ is a special case. Article 342 of the TFEU,61 as demonstrated
earlier, is without prejudice to the Court’s Rules of Procedure. Article 342
56

EP Rules of Procedure, supra note 50, rule 138 (1)–(2). However, slightly more relaxed
rules than those that govern the E.U. Parliament may apply by agreement to committee or
delegation meetings. Id. rule 138(4).
57
The Budget of the European Parliament, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, http://www.europarl.e
uropa.eu/parliament/public/staticDisplay.do?id=153&language=EN (last visited Aug. 20,
2011) (“[I]n 2008 over 1.5 million pages of documents were translated.”).
58
See EC Rules of Procedure, supra note 48 (lacking guidance on language rules
throughout).
59
Administrative Agreement Between the European Commission and the Kingdom of
Spain, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (C 73) 14. For example, Spanish people can address written
communications with the Commission in Basque or Catalan. See Robert F. Weber, Individual
Rights and Group Rights in the European Community’s Approach to Minority Languages, 17
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 361, 368–69 (2007).
60
Seventy-five percent of texts are originally drafted in English and twenty-four percent in
French, according to Ludwig Krämer in LANGUES ET CONSTRUCTION EUROPÉENNE 99
(Dominik Hanf et al. eds., 2010).
61
TFEU art. 342 (“The rules governing the languages of the institutions of the Union shall,
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the Statute of the Court of Justice of the
European Union, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously by means of
regulations.”). There are now three separate Rules of Procedure, one for each Union
jurisdiction: (i) the ECJ Rules of Procedure, (ii) the GC Rules of Procedure (formerly the
Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance), and (iii) the CST Rules of Procedure. See
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thus implicitly envisages the concept of “procedural languages” to be used in
the Court, which could be different from those which the Council has
designated as official for all other purposes.62 The Court is left free to
determine for itself the procedural languages which may be used in cases
before it.63 In fact, however, the Court’s list is exactly the same as that
provided in Regulation 1/58.64 Therefore, cases may be brought or referred
in any of the official languages. Article 64 of the Statute of the Court
provides:
The rules governing the language arrangements applicable at
the Court of Justice of the European Union shall be laid down
by a regulation of the Council acting unanimously. This
regulation shall be adopted either at the request of the Court of
Justice and after consultation of the Commission and the
European Parliament, or on a proposal from the Commission
and after consultation of the Court of Justice and of the
European Parliament.
Until those rules have been adopted, the provisions of the
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice and of the Rules of
Procedure of the General Court governing language
arrangements shall continue to apply. By way of derogation
from Articles 253 and 254 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, those provisions may only be amended or
repealed with the unanimous consent of the Council.65
Article 29(1) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure states: “[t]he language of
a case shall be Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish,
French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian,
Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish or

Consolidated Version of the Rules of Procedure of the European Union Civil Service Tribunal
art. 2(1), 2010 O.J. (C 177) 71 [hereinafter CST Rules of Procedure].
62
TFEU art. 342.
63
Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, art. 29, 2010 O.J. (C 177) [hereinafter ECJ
Rules of Procedure], available at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/20
11-07/rp_cjue_en.pdf (including the updated, consolidated version that takes into account
changes up to and including May 2011).
64
Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 1.
65
TEU, Protocol (No 3) on the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union art.
64, May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 210 [hereinafter Statute of the European Court of Justice].
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Swedish.”66 Article 35(1) of the General Court’s Rules of Procedure is
identical, and Article 29 of the Civil Service Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure
makes that Article applicable to the Civil Service Tribunal (CST).67
However, these provisions are manifestations of the external regime—the
Court allows all Member States and their citizens to use their official Union
languages in cases before it.68 Internally, however, the case must be
deliberated, and at an early stage, the Court adopted the practice of using
French for the deliberations amongst the judges. French remains the
dominant language within the institution.69 The Rules of Procedure of all
three courts provide that the court may request any institution which is party
to a case to provide “translations” of its pleadings into other official
languages.70 In practice, however, no translation is requested if the
procedural language is French.
IV. CASES ON THE EXTERNAL LANGUAGE REGIME
Many of the cases examined in this Article concern recruitment of staff
by the institutions. Nevertheless, some of the most important judicial
statements on this matter were made by the ECJ in Kik v. Office for
Harmonisation in the Internal Market (OHIM) (Kik).71 This case concerned
the external regime; in other words, dealings between the Office and a
Community citizen. In Kik, a citizen applied to OHIM for a mark to be
registered under the Community trademark legislation.72 The trademark
legislation lays down an very specific language regime. The applicant can
file in any official language, but must indicate a second language for possible

66
ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 63, art. 29(1). Consolidated Version of the Rules of
Procedure of the General Court of 2 May 1991, 2010 (C 177) 37 [hereinafter GC Rules of
Procedure].
67
GC Rules of Procedure, supra note 66, art. 35(1); CST Rules of Procedure, supra note
61, art. 29.
68
ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 63, art. 29(2)
69
Dinah Shelton, Reconcilable Differences? The Interpretation of Multilingual Treaties,
20 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 611, 618 (1997) (noting that all of the Court’s documents
are written in French, and then translated into other languages).
70
ECJ Rules of Procedure, supra note 63, art. 37(2); GC Rules of Procedure, supra note 66,
art. 43(2); CST Rules of Procedure, supra note 61, art. 34(2).
71
Case C-361/01 P, Kik v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283.
72
Council Regulation 40/94, Community Trademark, art. 115, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1
[hereinafter OHIM Trademark Legislation] (providing guidance as to the use of languages in
an application for a Community trademark).
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use in opposition proceedings.73 This secondary language must be one of the
five languages of OHIM (English, French, German, Spanish, and Italian).74
Moreover, if the application is not in one of these languages, OHIM may
communicate with the applicant in the second language that he or she
indicated.75 In Kik, a Dutch national submitted an application in Dutch but
indicated Dutch as the second language.76 She contested a decision
dismissing the application for not complying with the obligation to indicate
one of the five OHIM languages as a second language.77 The case was
dismissed by the Court of First Instance (CFI) and her heirs appealed to the
ECJ.78 They argued in particular that the restriction of the number of
possible second languages was contrary to what is now Article 18 of the
TFEU, which prohibits discrimination on grounds of nationality.79 The
Court rejected this submission, observing:
[T]he Treaty contains several references to the use of languages
in the European Union. None the less, those references cannot
be regarded as evidencing a general principle of Community
law that confers a right on every citizen to have a version of
anything that might affect his interests drawn up in his
language in all circumstances.80
The Court considered the particular circumstances of the Community
trademark regime, especially noting that the regime was voluntary and one in
which competing interests with different language preferences (for example,
the applicant for registration and a third party opposing registration) could be
involved.81 The Court referred to the interest of economic operators in
having access to a common regime which would reduce the cost and effort,

73
Id. art. 115(3) (“The applicant must indicate a second language which shall be a
languages of the [OHIM] the use of which he accepts as possible language of proceedings for
opposition, revocation or validity proceedings.”).
74
Id. art. 115(2).
75
Id. art. 115(6).
76
Kik, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283, para. 9(6).
77
Id. paras. 9(7)–(8).
78
Id. paras. 18–20.
79
Id. paras. 26–28.
80
Id. para. 82.
81
Id. paras. 86, 88.
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particularly in the form of translation costs, of applying for individual
national registrations.82 It concluded:
[T]he language regime of a body such as the Office is the result
of a difficult process which seeks to achieve the necessary
balance between the interests of economic operators and the
public interest in terms of the cost of proceedings, but also
between the interests of applicants for Community trade marks
and those of other economic operators in regard to access to
translations of documents which confer rights, or proceedings
involving more than one economic operator, such as
opposition, revocation and invalidity proceedings.83
The Court of First Instance was therefore right to
find . . . that, in determining the official languages of the
Community which may be used as languages of proceedings in
opposition, revocation and invalidity proceedings . . . where the
parties cannot agree on which language to use, the Council was
pursuing the legitimate aim of seeking an appropriate linguistic
solution to the difficulties arising from such a failure to agree.84
Similarly, the Court of First Instance was right to
hold . . . that, even if the Council did treat official languages of
the Community differently, its choice to limit the languages to
those which are most widely known in the European
Community is appropriate and proportionate.85
The reference to “the most widely known languages” is naturally
problematic—“most” is a word capable of qualification, and the question can
thus arise as to what legal consequences follow when the word is qualified
by inserting a number before it. Kik concerned a rule adopted by the
Council, for a specific purpose, which referred to the five most widelyknown languages.86 But what if the number were four? Which language
drops out, and why? Three—but which three? Two, or . . . one? Which—
and why? As pointed out above, it was when a three-language regime was
proposed for the future Union patent that there was opposition. And who
82
83
84
85
86

Id. para. 91.
Id. para. 92.
Id. para. 93.
Id. para. 94 (emphasis added).
Id. para 12.
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decides? Is it the Council, unanimously under Article 342 of the TFEU or
Article 118 of the TFEU? Or can each institution decide for itself, for its
own internal purposes? As we shall see, the answer is that sometimes it is
one, sometimes the other, according to the nature of the act in issue. If the
question is limiting the number of languages in which the institutions
communicate with citizens, only a unanimous Council act can provide the
basis.87 If the question is how the institutions, or a newly-created Union
body, communicate with those who want a service from them, such as a
property right, the Council again must act unanimously.88 However, the fact
that the requirement of unanimity appears in a different legal basis
(Article 118 of the TFEU) from the basis for the general language regime
(Article 342 of the TFEU) is a clear sign that the language regime may be
different from the general regime.
Based on these principles, the Court upheld the judgment of the lower
court and declared that Regulation 1/58 does not contain a general principle
of Community law:89
Regulation No 1 is merely an act of secondary law, whose legal
base is Article 21790 of the Treaty. To claim, as the applicant
does, that Regulation No 1 sets out a specific Community law
principle of equality between languages, which may not be
derogated from even by a subsequent regulation of the Council,
is tantamount to disregarding its character as secondary law.
Secondly, the Member States did not lay down rules governing
languages in the Treaty for the institutions and bodies of the
Community; rather, Article 217 of the Treaty enables the
Council, acting unanimously, to define and amend the rules
governing the languages of the institutions and to establish
different language rules. That Article does not provide that
once the Council has established such rules they cannot
subsequently be altered. It follows that the rules governing

87

TFEU art. 342.
Id. art. 118.
89
See generally Antoni Milian-Massana, Droit Linguistique Compare: Le Régime Juridique
du Multilinguisme dans 1’Union Européene. Le Mythe ou la Réalité du Principe d’Égalité des
Langues, 38 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS 1 (2004), available at http://www.editionsthemis.com/up
loaded/revue/article/rjtvol38num1/05-Milian-Massana.pdf.
90
TFEU art. 324 (e.g., EC Treaty art. 217).
88
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languages laid down by Regulation No 1 cannot be deemed to
amount to a principle of Community law.91
There is no inconsistency between this position, in Kik, and that taken by
the Court in the Skoma-Lux (Skoma-Lux) case.92 Skoma-Lux concerned the
question of whether a Community regulation could apply to a person,
possibly to his detriment, if it had not been published in the relevant official
language.93 While a person must be presumed to know the law, this
presupposes that it is available to him in his own language.94 Kik, on the
other hand, concerns a customer for a service.95 Kik is not a case of
unilaterally applying a rule against a person’s will, on pain of criminal
penalties. Moreover, in Kik, it was the legislature which laid down the
restricted language regime,96 inter alia, to take account of the fact that other
parties (whose language preferences might be different from the applicant’s)
might also be involved, for example, by opposing the application. This was
not a case of a mere administrative act or practice concerning choice of
language. The courts naturally recognize that the legislature has wide
discretion in such matters, much wider than would necessarily be recognized
in the case of a purely decisional act.97
V. THE UNION STAFF REGULATIONS
In a number of cases brought by Union officials, or by candidates for
recruitment as officials, the courts have been pragmatic about the use of
particular official languages inside the institutions, notwithstanding the

91

Case C-361/01 P, Kik v. OHIM, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283, para. 16 (emphasis added).
Case C-161/06, Skoma-Lux v. Celní ředitelství Olomouc, 2007 E.C.R. I-10841.
93
Id. para. 1.
94
Id. para. 41 (“[I]t would be contra legem . . . to require [Member States] to impose on
individuals obligations contained in legislation of general application which is not
published . . . in the official language of those States.”).
95
Kik, 2003 E.C.R. I-8283. In arguments, OHIM suggested that by making the application,
the applicant was implicitly consenting to the language regime. Id. para. 36. The Court
confirmed this view: “Account must also be taken of the fact that the Community trade mark
was created for the benefit not of all citizens, but of economic operators, and that economic
operators are not under any obligation to make use of it.” Id. para. 88.
96
Id. para. 94.
97
See Case C-443/07 P, Centeno Mediavilla v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. I-10945 (confirming
legislative discretion in relation to the choice of transitional provisions).
92

606

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 39:587

absence of any formal legal basis for such practices, such as a decision under
Article 6 of Regulation 1/58.98
To assist in understanding these cases, it is perhaps useful to begin by
indicating what rules govern the employment of Union staff. For permanent
officials, the relevant rules are set out in the Staff Regulations of Officials of
the European Union (SR or Staff Regulations).99 The Conditions of
Employment of Other Servants (CEOS or Conditions of Employment),
which are part of the Staff Regulations, lay down the rules applicable to
temporary staff and contract agents.100 These categories of staff are
employed on contracts, which may be for a fixed term or indefinite.101
The SR/CEOS apply to the vast majority of Union staff. They apply to
those employed by the “historic” institutions (i.e., the Parliament, the ECJ,
the Council, the Commission, and the Court of Auditors), those employed by
Community organizations, (i.e., the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions), and those who work for more recently created
organizations (i.e., the European Ombudsman and the European Data
Protection Supervisor). The Lisbon Treaty and a consequential amendment
of the SR/CEOS have added a new organization to those covered by the
SR/CEOS, namely the new European External Action Service, which is
under the authority of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy.102 Article 1 of the Staff Regulations makes them applicable
to “officials”, which, in the absence of qualification would mean “officials”
of the institutions as defined in the TEU and TFEU; however, Article 1b
extends their scope, by deeming the newer bodies just mentioned to be
institutions for the purposes of the Staff Regulations, so that these

98

Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 6.
European Commission: “Legal Issues and Questions Relating to the Staff Regulations”
Unit, COMPENDIUM OF THE STAFF REGULATIONS OF OFFICIALS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
& THE CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER SERVANTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES II-3
(2004) [hereinafter STAFF REGULATIONS], available at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/to
c100_en.pdf.
100
Id.
101
Id. at I-4, II-3. The Staff Regulations apply to “officials” of the European Communities,
while the Conditions of Employment apply to temporary, auxiliary, contract, and local staff.
Id.
102
About the EEAS, EUROPEAN EXTERNAL ACTION SERVICE, http://eeas.europa.eu/backgrou
nd/index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 20, 2011); European Parliament and Council Regulation
1080/2010, Amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and
the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities, 2010 O.J. (L 311) 1.
99
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Regulations can apply to bodies which are not “institutions” under the
Treaties.103
The final category is Union agencies: small bodies that carry out
specialized functions which either result from a new Union “competence” or
which have been devolved from the Commission.104 There are currently over
thirty agencies dealing with matters as diverse as coordinating the fight
against organized crime, promotion of vocational training, air transport
safety, food safety, and registration of chemicals.105 Article 1a(2) of the SR
provides that, where the founding act of the agency so provides, the
SR/CEOS also apply to agencies, which are also assimilated to institutions
for the purposes of the SR/CEOS.106
The only significant exceptions to these rules are the two banking
institutions—the European Investment Bank and the European Central Bank.
Given their specialized functions, and since they must compete on the
employment market with commercial banks, each of these bodies has its own
Staff Regulations, which differ in several respects from the SR/CEOS.107
The cases discussed below concern the extent to which the language rules
in the Treaty and in Regulation 1/58 apply or do not apply inside the
institutions and other bodies whose staff are governed by the SR/CEOS.
This case law is not directly transposable to bodies which apply other rules,
such as the two banks, which have their own internal language practices.108
The basic language requirements for officials are set out in Article 28 of
the SR: “An official may be appointed only on condition that . . . (f) he
produces evidence of a thorough knowledge of one of the languages of the
Communities and of a satisfactory knowledge of another language of the

103

STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99, at I-4.
See Alexandra Gatto, Governance in the European Union: A Legal Perspective, 12
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 487, 505 (2006) (describing the function of agencies as a response to
regulatory needs).
105
Id., at 505 nn.87–90.
106
STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99, at I-4.
107
See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR STAFF OF THE
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK (2011), available at http://www.ecb.int/ecb/jobs/pdf/conditions_o
f_employment.pdf?4f202f4b95e1c0504e114c2abf3b994a; EUROPEAN INV. BANK, STAFF
REGULATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (2009), available at http://www.eib.org/at
tachments/general/eib_staff_regulations_2009_en.pdf.
108
See, e.g., EUROPEAN INV. BANK, CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR STAFF OF THE
EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 107 (stating that the two banks do not contain explicit
language requirements, but in practice most published vacancy notices require a high standard
in English).
104
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Communities to the extent necessary for the performance of his duties.”109
The rules in the CEOS on this matter are the same.110
The context of these requirements is given by both Article 27 of the SR
and Article 12 of the CEOS: “Recruitment shall be directed to securing for
the institution the services of persons of the highest standard of ability,
efficiency and integrity, recruited on the broadest possible geographical basis
from among nationals of the Member States of the Communities.”111
It is important to note, however, that like the other conditions for
recruitment (e.g., educational qualifications and professional experience),
these are only minimum requirements and the institutions may always
impose more severe requirements “in the interest of the service” (i.e., where
it is objectively justified by the nature of the post or posts to be filled, or
more generally by the factual circumstances within the institution).112 So far
as languages are concerned, an institution is free to require, for example, a
satisfactory knowledge of not just one other Community language, but of
two or three others, or even more.113 Likewise, it may impose a higher
standard for the second language than just a satisfactory knowledge.114 It
may require that the “primary” language be a particular language, or it may
require satisfactory (or greater) knowledge of a particular language as a
second, third, etc., so long as this is objectively necessary “in the interest of
the service.”115 Sometimes a certain condition has the effect that those
recruited are primarily or exclusively speakers of a particular language. If,
for example, there is a need for Dutch lawyers in particular, a condition
requiring a qualification in Dutch law is legitimate, despite its exclusionary
109

STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99, art. 28, I-14.
Id. art. 12(2)(e), I-6; id. art. 82(3)(e), II-26.
111
Id. art. 27, I-14. For the CEOS version, see id. art. 12, II-6.
112
This right for institutions has been confirmed in many staff cases, in particular as to
language requirements, for example, Case 108/88, Jaenicke Cendoya v. Comm’n, 1989
E.C.R. 2711, para. 24; Case T-73/01, Pappas v. Comm. of the Regions, 2003 E.C.R. II-1011,
para. 85; Case T-376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, paras. 36–39.
113
Competitions for translators normally require knowledge of two or three official
languages in addition to one’s primary language, and sometimes knowledge of certain
specified languages.
114
Thus, for example, if Italian interpreters or translators are needed, it is not merely
legitimate, but rather essential to require that the language of which one has “thorough”
knowledge be Italian and no other. In practice, interpreters’ competitions normally require not
only mother-tongue standard in one language, but a similar level in at least one other.
115
For example, the requirement cannot simply be an artifice to reduce the numbers of
applicants, still less can the intention be to give an arbitrary advantage to particular languages
or nationalities (which would be unlawful).
110
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effects.116 It will be readily appreciated that this concept of the “interest of
the service,” which is peculiar to the SR and CEOS, allows a different and
far more flexible approach to language rules than is possible under the strict
external regime described above.117 This case law has grown independently
of Article 6 of Regulation 1/58, which only refers to the potential content of
the institutions’ internal rules. Those rules do not, in any case, provide for
any particular internal language regime. The following cases involve the
recognition of the primacy of the SR/CEOS, as lex specialis, over the
external rules. Thus, they make a clear distinction between internal and
external situations.
Save perhaps for certain specialist jobs, the linguistic “interest of the
service” evidenced in the recruitment process is twofold and, in fact, reflects
the internal/external distinction within Regulation 1/58. On the one hand, the
institutions aim, as far as is practicable, to have staff members representative
of every Member State nationality to comply with their employment
obligations under Article 27 of the SR and their linguistic obligations under
the TEU and the TFEU and Regulation 1/58. To communicate externally in
every official language at a mother-tongue standard, a mix of staff is a
necessity. On the other hand, these staff members must also communicate
effectively with each other within the institution. For this purpose, there is
an inevitable factual convergence on certain widely-known languages, which
are used as “vehicular languages,” because they are the most widely-taught
second languages throughout the Union. The existence of this factual
situation makes it necessary, particularly at a time when the number of
official languages has virtually doubled,118 to make a satisfactory knowledge
116

This example is especially significant: first, there is no prohibited indirect discrimination
in favor of Dutch Nationals or Dutch-speakers, since the requirement is objectively justified
by the need to recruit people qualified in Dutch law; any exclusionary effect is the inevitable
secondary consequence of a legitimate need, which must be accepted. Second, the difference
is not based on language, since Dutch-speaking Belgians would not qualify either (unless their
qualification happened to be in Dutch rather than Belgian law).
117
See supra Part III (discussing Regulation 1/58 and language practices in the institutions).
118
Official EU Languages, supra note 13. From 1958–1972, there were four official
languages: French, German, Dutch, and Italian. The first enlargement added English and
Danish (and nearly added Norwegian). The next brought Greek, in 1981. Then came Spanish
and Portuguese, in 1986. The 1995 enlargement added Finnish and Swedish (and once more
nearly added Norwegian). These eleven languages were official until 2004, when ten Member
States joined, all but one of which brought a new official language. The 2007 accession, and
the declaration by Ireland of Irish as an official Union language, brought the number of
official languages to 23. See 1958 O.J. (17) 385; 1972 O.J. (L 73) 14; 1979 O.J. (L 291) 17;
1985 O.J. (L 302) 23; 1994 O.J. (C 241) 21; 2003 O.J. (L 236) 33; 2006 O.J. (L 363) 1.
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of one or more of these common languages a condition of recruitment. It is
precisely this kind of recruitment condition which has led to many of the
cases we shall now consider.
VI. CASES ON THE INTERNAL LANGUAGE REGIME
When we refer to an internal regime, we are discussing only how the
institutions organize their everyday work. Nevertheless, it is clear from the
cases brought in the last ten years that this is perceived as institutionally
significant, at least when it results in something being written down and
published officially. In the past, when there were fewer Member States and
fewer official languages, there was no perceived need to specify knowledge
of particular languages as a requirement for recruitment of officials. The
question tended to resolve itself as candidates for recruitment almost always
had as their second or third language at least one of the languages used as a
de facto working language in the institutions. The sudden and enormous
increase in the number of Member States and of official languages in 2004
changed all that.
The case law concerning vacancy notices, competition notices (for
recruitment of officials), and notices of selection procedures (for temporary
agents and contract agents) rightly requires that the notice state, with the
greatest possible precision, all the essential conditions for admission to the
particular competition or selection/vacancy procedure.119 It thus became
inevitable that what is necessary for effective communication, especially
internal communication, had to be set out, so that potential candidates could
know, in light of their own linguistic abilities, if there was any point in
applying. What had until then been an open secret became an official policy,
set out in official publications such as competition notices. While the
purpose of such a notice is purely internal—to recruit candidates who have
the qualifications the institutions need—setting out such matters officially for
the first time cannot pass unnoticed. It was not long before some Member
States, feeling that certain fundamental principles and assumptions were at
stake, reacted.

119

See, e.g., Case T-146/99, Teixeira Neves v. Court of Justice, 2000 E.C.R. II-731, paras.
34–36.
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A. Court of First Instance Cases 2000–2005
The first four cases considered in this Article are direct actions brought,
not by Member States, but by officials or candidates, who took issue with the
communication of documents in an official language other than the language
they wished to see used.
In Rudolph v. Commission, the CFI was faced with the question of
whether an official could impose the use of a particular language on the
institution, by making a complaint in that language.120 Was the institution
then required to reply in that language? The answer is no: the institution
may reply in any appropriate official language, provided the official has
sufficient knowledge of it to understand the reply.121 In the event of a
dispute, the burden of proof as to this degree of knowledge is on the
institution.122 It thus appears that Article 2 of Regulation 1/58,123 Article
41(4) of the CFR,124 and Article 24 of the TFEU125 do not apply to internal
communications between the institution and its officials. This flexible rule
applies not only to existing staff, but to candidates for recruitment. In
Bonaiti Brighina v. Commission, the CFI held that a candidate could not
oblige the institution to conduct correspondence in his or her mother tongue
if the institution preferred to use another official language known to the
candidate.126 Interestingly, the CFI referred to Article 6 of Regulation 1/58
in this case. Even though the Commission had not (and still has not) adopted
an internal decision applying it, the mere existence of Article 6 confirms that
the institutions can lawfully have internal linguistic practices, such as using
certain widely-known languages for internal communication.
In Hendrickx v. Council, the CFI accepted as self-evident that it was
justifiable for the General Secretariat of the Council to require, in an internal
competition notice, that candidates have a satisfactory knowledge of French
and English “for functional reasons.”127 This is a reference to the long-
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See Case T-197/98, Rudolph v. Comm’n, 2000 E.C.R. II-241, paras. 34–47. This
question is repeated in subsequent cases, not only those discussed below, e.g., Case T-95/04,
Lavagnoli v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. II-A-2-569, para. 48.
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Rudolph, 2000 E.C.R. II-241, para. 46.
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Id.
123
Regulation 1/58, supra note 11, art. 2.
124
CFR art. 41(4).
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TFEU art. 24.
126
Case T-118/99, Bonaiti Brighina v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-97, paras. 12–17.
127
Case T-376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, para 33.
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standing internal practice of the Council, in which internal communication is
in one or another of these languages.
In Rasmussen v. Commission, the CFI applied Rudolph and confirmed
explicitly that Regulation 1/58 does not apply in relations between officials
and their institution.128 The institution may use other official languages,
provided they allow the official to readily understand the communications in
question, which in Rasmussen was material in a disciplinary procedure.129
B. The Opinion in Eurojust
The most exhaustive discussion of language requirements so far
attempted is to be found in the Opinion of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro
in Spain v. Eurojust (Eurojust).130 This case concerned a number of notices
calling for expressions of interest which were published in the Official
Journal by a new Union body set up to promote judicial cooperation.131 This
would create reserve lists for the hiring of temporary staff to fill certain
posts.132 For all but one of these posts, the notices required either a
satisfactory or excellent knowledge of English, and some positions also
required French to the same standard.133 For certain posts, knowledge of
other official languages as well was an advantage, but not a condition.134
There were also procedural linguistic requirements: while the application
form could be submitted in any official language, it also had to be submitted
in English, and the accompanying curriculum vitae/resume and “motivation
letter” (explaining why they wanted the job and why they thought they were
qualified for it) also had to be in English.135 Spain attacked both the
substantive and the procedural conditions, asking for the notices to be
annulled to the extent that they: (a) imposed a requirement to know English
(and in some cases French) and (b) required the use of English in the
application.136 It put forward three grounds of annulment: (i) infringement of
Article 12 of the CEOS, because the requirements supposedly went beyond
128

Case T-203/03, Rasmussen v. Comm’n, 2005 E.C.R. II-1287, para 60.
Id.
130
Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2077.
131
Council Decision 2002/187/JHA, Setting Up Eurojust with a View to Reinforcing the
Fight Against Serious Crime, 2002 O.J. (L 63) 1 (EU).
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Id.
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Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2077, paras. 19–20.
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Id.
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Id. para. 20.
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Id. para. 1.
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the minimum required; (ii) infringement of Eurojust’s language rules which
were those of Regulation 1/58; and (iii) infringement of Article 12 of the EC
(now Article 18 of the TFEU), prohibiting discrimination on grounds of
nationality, since the conditions allegedly favored those whose primary
language was English or French.137
The Advocate-General begins, in paragraphs 34–37, by putting language
requirements in context:
the question of linguistic requirements does not fall solely
within the scope of regulations or specific Treaty provisions.
This question must be linked with rights, with a principle and
with an objective which are fundamental to the European
Union. It is important to bear in mind in that connection that
respect for and promotion of linguistic diversity are not in any
way incompatible with the objective of the common market.
On the contrary, against the background of a Community based
on the free movement of persons, ‘the protection of the
linguistic rights and privileges of individuals is of particular
importance.’138 It is common ground that the right of a national
of the Union to use his own language is conducive to his
exercise of the right of free movement and his integration into
the host state. In those circumstances, the Court condemns all
forms of indirect discrimination based on knowledge of
languages.
In a Union intended to be an area of freedom, security and
justice, in which it is sought to establish a society characterised
by pluralism, respect for linguistic diversity is of fundamental
importance. That is an aspect of the respect which the Union
owes, in the terms of Article 6(3) EU, to the national identities
of the Member States. The principle of respect for linguistic
diversity has also been expressly upheld by the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and by the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe. That principle is a
specific expression of the plurality inherent in the European
Union.

137

Id. paras. 21–24.
This statement references Case C-137/84, Ministère Pub. v. Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681,
para. 11.
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....
Language is not merely a functional means of social
communication. It is an essential attribute of personal identity
and, at the same time, a fundamental component of national
identity.
In my opinion, the language regime of the Union institutions
must not be severed from that context or from that principle.
That regime guarantees that the linguistic rights of those
individuals who have direct access to the Union institutions
will be recognised. It stems from the special nature of the
relationship between the Union and its citizens. It must
therefore be regarded as a direct expression of the linguistic
diversity inherent in the European Union. It thus constitutes a
fundamental institutional rule of the European Union.139
The Advocate-General recognized that this rule must be qualified because
of Kik. However, any such exceptions to “fundamental institutional rules”
must be narrow and subject to an obligation of express justification in every
case.140 The principle of linguistic diversity cannot be regarded as absolute:
“it is necessary to accept restrictions in practice, in order to reconcile
observance of that principle with the imperatives of institutional and
administrative life.”141 The Advocate-General then makes the crucial
distinction between the internal and the external regimes.142 He sees three
situations—two external, one internal.143 The first external situation is
communication between an institution and citizens.144 This deserves the
“highest level of protection” since it is linked to democratic participation in
the Union.145 The strict regime of Regulation 1/58 applies. The second
external situation is “relations between citizens and the administration,”
139
Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust 2005
ECR I-2077, paras. 34–37 [hereinafter Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro] (citations omitted),
available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=49769&pageIndex=0&
doclang=en&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&cid=278038.
140
Id. para. 50 (“[I]t is not sufficient to seek to justify an internal language regime by
reference to ‘the nature of things,’ as Eurojust saw fit to do before the Court.”). Despite these
strictures, it seems as if that was exactly what the GC is prepared to accept. See Case T376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, para. 33.
141
Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139, para. 40.
142
Id. paras. 40–49.
143
Id.
144
Id. para. 43.
145
Id.
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which refers to participation in administrative procedures.146 Here, the
Advocate-General suggests that it may be possible if circumstances so
require to derogate from the rule that everything happens in the citizen’s own
language, but any such derogation requires a legal basis adopted by the
Council under what is now Article 342 of the TFEU (or Article 118 of the
TFEU).147 This is a reference to the situation in cases such as Kik. On the
other hand, the first external situation corresponds to that in the subsequent
Skoma-Lux case.
The internal situation is quite different. Referring to Article 6 of
Regulation 1/58, the Advocate-General states:
Whilst linguistic diversity is the fundamental rule in the context
of outside contacts, that is because it is necessary to respect the
linguistic rights of persons having access to Union institutions
and bodies. The Treaty and the case-law are based on the
understanding that the choice of the language of
communication is a matter for the Member State or the person
who has a relationship with the institutions. On the other hand,
in the context of the internal functioning of Union institutions,
the choice of the language to be used for internal
communications is the responsibility of those institutions,
which are entitled to impose that choice on their employees.
....
However, that autonomy must be strictly circumscribed. It
can be exercised only within the limits allowed by the Treaty
[which] entrusts principally to the Council the responsibility of
defining the language regime of the Union institutions. That
responsibility implies a considerable degree of latitude,
provided that it does not in any way undermine the essence of
the principle of linguistic diversity. In contrast, the Union
institutions and bodies enjoy only a limited discretion for
implementation of that regime. They must not be allowed to
use it otherwise than for the purposes of their internal
operational needs.
In those circumstances, the choice of one or more Union
languages for internal purposes can be allowed only if it is
146
147

Id. para. 44.
Id.
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based on objective considerations relating to the functional
needs of the body concerned and if it does not give rise to
unjustified differences of treatment as between Union citizens.
It is important to make certain, first, that the regime chosen
reflects the specific needs of the body concerned, having
regard, for example, to the history of its coming into being, the
location of its seat, its internal communication needs and the
nature of the functions which it must discharge. It is necessary
to verify, secondly, that the choice made does not compromise
equal access for Union citizens to the jobs offered by Union
institutions and bodies.148
The Advocate-General then applies these principles to the two issues
before the Court; first the legality of the substantive conditions requiring
knowledge of certain specified languages, then the procedural requirement to
submit the application and supporting documents in English.149 Concerning
the substantive requirements, in the light of his conclusion that a limited
internal language regime requires specific justification, the AdvocateGeneral considers the justifications put forward by Eurojust: (a) the need to
know Eurojust’s working languages (or more generally, the need for
effective internal communication), and (b) the nature of the duties of the
particular posts.150
As to (a), “it is beyond doubt . . . that it may be necessary to choose an
internal working language in order to ensure the proper functioning of Union
institutions and bodies. Such a choice is particularly legitimate where the
body in question is a specialised organisation with limited resources.”151 The
Advocate-General doubted, however, that this could justify the need to know
two working languages, since “to ensure good communication within the
organisation, command of a single common language would appear
sufficient. As long as all Eurojust’s employees are fluent in that language, it
is clear that the requirement of a second working language cannot be
justified for reasons of internal communications.”152 This did not preclude
an institution from having more than one working language if its nature
justified it, but even then it should be enough to require knowledge of just
148
149
150
151
152

Id. para. 46, 48–49.
Id. para. 52.
Id. paras. 53–67.
Id. para. 55.
Id.
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one of them: “the cumulative requirement of knowledge of several
languages cannot be justified by internal communication needs and can only
be indicative of a wish to afford a privileged status to certain Union
languages.”153 On the facts of the case, justification (a) did not appear to
have been made out, since it was not clear whether any one or more
particular languages had actually been chosen as the means of internal
communication, and Eurojust’s Rules of Procedure did not shed any light on
the matter.154
As to (b), the Advocate-General is more receptive to Eurojust’s
arguments:
[T]he nature of the proposed duties may justify requiring the
command of a language other than the one used for internal
communications within the organisation. However, a measure
laying down wider-ranging linguistic requirements than those
appearing in the Conditions of Employment must not run
counter to a fundamental principle such as the principle of
non-discrimination.
Accordingly, linguistic requirements
imposed by reason of the nature of the work to be undertaken
must be strictly linked with the posts to be filled and they must
not result in any dilution of the requirement of geographical
diversity of Union staff.155
It was thus necessary to see whether “the prescribed linguistic
requirements display a necessary and direct connection with the proposed
duties”156 and whether “the requirements decided upon do not excessively
undermine the objective of ensuring a geographical balance within the Union
institutions and the bodies.”157 The burden of proof was, however, on the
153

Id. para. 56. But see id. para. 44.
See id. para. 58 (confirming what the CFI had already held in Bonaiti Brighina, that
notwithstanding the terms of Article 6 of Regulation 1/58, an internal working language
regime can be validly established by some other decision or by mere practice, even if there is
nothing in the Rules of Procedure).
155
Id. para. 61.
156
Id. para. 62 (“Should that link not be established, such requirements must be regarded as
involving discrimination detrimental to Union nationals who have the necessary skills, within
the meaning of Article 12 of the Conditions of Employment, to be appointed to the posts to be
filled.”).
157
Id. para. 63 (“It is clear that preference for certain languages by way of professional
requirements gives an advantage to those European citizens who have those languages as their
mother tongues. However, such an advantage is liable to give rise to indirect discrimination
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party alleging that the conditions were indirectly discriminatory.158 Spain
had not discharged its burden in this case, since (a) the evidence showed that
in fact there was a balanced representation of nationalities in the selection
procedures and in Eurojust generally, and (b) even if Eurojust’s explanations
of the link between the language requirements and the duties of each post
were not always clear, it was only where the condition was manifestly
inappropriate that the courts should intervene, and this was not the case
here.159
Finally, there was the question of the procedural requirement: here, the
Advocate-General seems once again to reason differently from the CFI.160 In
Hendrickx, and in the recent Italian cases, the CFI holds to the line already
taken in Bonaiti Brighina, that candidates in competitions are covered
exclusively by the SR/CEOS.161 The rules in Regulation 1/58 (and even
those in the TEU and the TFEU) concerning the “external” language regime
simply do not apply. The Advocate-General, on the other hand, assumes that
Article 2 of Regulation 1/58 applies.162 Requiring candidates to submit an
English version of their application form, and to submit supporting
documents in English, is a derogation from the rule that citizens may address
the institutions in any language.163 He looks for a justification for the
exception.164 He recognizes that candidates in a selection procedure are not
in the same position as citizens in general.165 This difference may justify
treating the case differently, so long as the contested procedure is itself
objective. This will be the case if the requirement to use a given language in
the procedure is “directly linked with the skills necessary for performance of
the duties . . . and . . . does not have an excessive adverse impact on the legal
interests of potential candidates.”166 The institution cannot therefore invoke
mere organizational convenience, unless the requirement forces candidates
adversely affecting other Union citizens. By virtue of the principle of non-discrimination on
grounds of nationality, therefore, a linguistic requirement imposed in connection with the
needs of the service must not to result in a vacant post being reserved for one or more
specified nationalities.”).
158
Id. para. 64.
159
Id. paras. 65–67.
160
Id. paras. 68–73.
161
See supra Part VI.A (discussing the cases on the internal language regime in the Court of
First Instance from 2000–2005).
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Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139, para. 68.
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into a practical demonstration of language skills that they would need for the
post.167 This requirement can be justified because there is a link with the
objective requirements of the post.168 In this case, the candidates could
check for themselves exactly what the requirements of the job were, since all
of the notices had been published in all the Union languages in the Official
Journal.169
The Advocate-General concluded that Spain’s application should be
rejected, save as to one of the posts, for a librarian/archivist, where no clear
link between the duties of the post and the requirement to submit the
application documents in English were provided.170 Given the completeness
of this analysis, it is regrettable that the Court did not, in the end, decide on
these matters at all. Instead, contrary to the Advocate-General’s suggestion,
it rejected Spain’s application for annulment as inadmissible, holding that a
Member State could not attack a selection notice published by Eurojust.171
Only the candidates themselves had such a right.172 This may be thought
surprising, since Member States, like institutions, are “privileged” applicants
and interveners; they do not have to demonstrate an interest in their action or
intervention173 as they are presumed to have an interest in the legality of any
act of the institutions. The Court was perhaps unenthusiastic about dealing
with these sensitive questions, if it did not have to. However, it was likely
even at the time that they would come before the Court in any case, as a
result of an appeal against a judgment of the CFI in some future case, and
that is indeed what has happened, in one of the subsequent Member State
cases which form the third act of the story. The Court’s reasons were
specific to the position of Eurojust, whose “competences” were, at least at
that time, outside those of the Community. Those reasons did not apply to
acts of Community institutions over which the Court had jurisdiction under
what was then Article 230 of the EC (now Article 263 of the TFEU). This
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Id. para. 71. There was a different method of publication for the notices attacked in
Cases T-185/05, Italy v. Comm'n [2008] ECR II-3207 and in Joined Cases, T-156 and 232/07,
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Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139, paras. 77, 72.
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Case C-160/03, Spain v. Eurojust, 2005 E.C.R. I-2077.
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See TFEU art. 263 (compare para. 2, with para. 4); Statute of the European Court of
Justice, supra note 65, art. 40, paras. 1–2.
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has since been expressly confirmed by the CFI in Case T-185/05, Italy v.
Commission (Case T-185/05).174
C. Judgments of the Court of First Instance/General Court and the Civil
Service Tribunal Since 2006
The jurisdiction previously exercised by the ECJ over direct actions by
Member States against acts of the institutions—of which Eurojust is an
example—is now exercised by the General Court (GC) (formerly the CFI).175
Thus, the most recent actions by Member States against language
requirements in recruitment procedures have been brought in the CFI/ GC.
This means that, as in Kik, the question can be taken to the ECJ on appeal.
At the same time, the CFI’s former jurisdiction over staff cases (including
those brought by candidates for recruitment) has been transferred to the
European Union Civil Service Tribunal (CST).176
We have already seen, in Part A of this Chapter, that by 2004 the CFI
already had established a number of principles which diverge from the
Opinion of the Advocate-General in Eurojust. Thus:
(a) officials are entirely subject to the SR/CEOS and therefore
the institutions do not have to apply Article 2 or 3 of
Regulation 1/58 in dealings with them. Institutions can
use whatever Union language suits them, so long as the
official has sufficient knowledge of it to understand these
communications;177
(b) candidates in recruitment procedures are also subject to
the internal language regime;178
(c) in the case of one of the historic institutions, a requirement
to know a particular language, or indeed two particular

174

Case T-185/05, Italy v Comm’n [2008] ECR II-3207.
TFEU art. 256(1) (e.g., EC Treaty art. 225(1)); Statute of the European Court of Justice,
supra note 65, art. 51 (stating that acts of the Commission are not excepted from this change,
unlike certain acts of the Council and the Parliament, for which jurisdiction remains with the
Court).
176
Council Decision 2004/752, establishing the European Union Civil Service Tribunal,
2004 O.J. (L 333) 7 (EC).
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See supra text accompanying note 120 (discussing Rudolph).
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See supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing Bonaiti Brighina).
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languages, can be justified “for functional reasons” with
no need for specific justification.179
Principles (a) and (b) demonstrate that it is not necessary, in relation to
recruitment procedures, to give any specific justification, e.g., for derogating
from Regulation 1/58 or from the Treaty principle of linguistic diversity.
This is contrary to what the Advocate-General suggested in Eurojust.
Instead, the relevant criterion is simply “the interest of the service.” Only if
an applicant shows that a language condition is not justified by reference to
the needs of the service can there be any question of annulment. Even a
requirement to know two particular languages can be justified by principle
(c), again contrary to the Advocate-General’s view.180 These principles have
been further confirmed and developed in the most recent CFI/GC judgments,
in particular, the following three cases.
1. Italy v. Commission181
This case concerned a vacancy notice for the recruitment of the DirectorGeneral of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), which was published in
full the Official Journal, but only in English, French, and German.182 A
short notice referring candidates to this full publication also appeared in
some international publications and in the main daily newspapers in all the
Member States, including two of the main Italian papers.183 These shortform publications were in the language of the newspaper or periodical.184
This method of publication was pursuant to an internal Commission Decision
of 2004 on recruitment procedures for senior staff.185 Because of a lack of
translation capacity, for a two-year period vacancy notices would be
published only in three languages.186
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See supra text accompanying note 127 (discussing Hendrickx).
But see infra note 200. The GC seems to have retreated from this position in the most
recent cases. It remains to be seen, in the light of future judgments, whether this is temporary.
181
Case T-185/05, Italy v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-3207, paras. 29–32.
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The notice thus published only referred to the minimum language
requirements under Article 28 of the SR.187 However, it also required
candidates to submit a curriculum vitae/resume and a “letter of motivation”
in English, French, or German.188 Italy sought the annulment of the notice
and of the internal decision on publication of senior posts.189 The application
succeeded, but only in relation to the method of publication.190
The CFI held the action admissible, both in respect of the notice and the
internal decision, unlike what happened in Eurojust,191 where the ECJ held
Article 230 of the EC (now Article 263 of the TFEU) inapplicable to acts of
bodies which do not exercise Community “competence.”192 In this case, the
contested act was of the Commission.
As to substance, two issues arose: the method of publication and the
language conditions in the application procedure.193 Concerning publication,
the CFI first repeats the Kik principle, that there is no general right for every
citizen to receive everything from the institutions in his or her Union
language.194 Then, not following the Eurojust opinion, it repeats instead its
own rule, that Regulation 1/58 does not apply to existing staff or to
candidates for recruitment.195 Nor do the SR require vacancies to be
published in all official languages.196 It followed that the Commission was
entitled to adopt an internal decision restricting the languages of
publication.197 As to the substantive language requirements in the notice, the
CFI points out that the conditions in the SR/CEOS are only a minimum, and
the institution may always lay down stricter conditions, including knowledge
of certain languages, “where the requirements of the service or those of the
post so require.”198 The reference to “requirements of the service” as an
alternative to the requirements of the post clearly means that there is no need
to justify the condition post by post, and that a general situation within the
187

Id. para. 8. For the relevant Staff Regulation, see STAFF REGULATIONS, supra note 99,
art. 28, at I-14 (requiring a thorough knowledge of one Union language and satisfactory
knowledge of another).
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Case T-185/05, Italy v. Comm’n, 2008 E.C.R. II-3207, para. 8.
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service is enough (such as the two-language regime in the Council in
Hendrickx). This is confirmation of the difference between the GC (the old
CFI) and the ideas of Advocate-General Poiares Maduro. The CFI could
have limited itself to the requirements of the post since this case, like
Eurojust, concerned a vacancy notice for a specific post. The fact that the
CFI nevertheless referred also to the “requirements of the service” is
therefore significant. Even if it is technically an obiter dictum in Italy v.
Commission, we shall see that it has become a rule in later cases. Later cases
concern competitions creating reserve lists to fill possible future vacancies,
so that it is not known at the time of publication which posts the successful
candidates may be offered. The requirements of the service are what matters
in respect of competitions of this kind.
There is a connection between the publication regime and the language
conditions. If the latter are justified by the needs of the service or of the
post, then publication only in the languages concerned is also justified: “The
fact that the text of the vacancy notice concerned is only available in
[certain] languages does not result in discrimination between candidates,
since they must all have an understanding of at least one of those
languages.”199 However, there is a difference between only publishing in
certain languages and only publishing in certain language versions of the
Official Journal. The latter practice is likely to lead to discrimination
between readers of that Journal, since even readers who meet the language
conditions will not be informed of the existence of the competition, unless
other measures are taken to ensure that all potential candidates are
informed.200 The Commission’s decision to post the notices had not
provided for such alternative measures and was thus unlawful, as was the
notice itself, as likely to lead to discrimination between candidates on
grounds of language.201 The fact that the three languages concerned were
“fairly widely spoken in Europe” was not enough to justify the potential
discrimination.202
199

Id.
Id. paras. 135–138. However, the Court introduces ambiguity in 152 by suggesting that
alternative measures should have been taken to inform those who did not have sufficient
knowledge of English, French, or German to discover the content of the notice. This is
contrary to the Court’s acceptance of the trilingual publishing framework as justifiable in para.
134, so long as the post possesses and the notice communicates a substantive requirement to
know one or more of the three languages.
201
Id. paras. 141–142, 151.
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2. Joined Cases Spain v. Commission and Italy v. Commission203
These cases concerned not a vacancy notice for a particular job, but
notices for three open competitions to establish reserve lists for possible
future recruitment. The notices were published in the Official Journal
pursuant to Annex III SR by the European Personnel Selection Office, the
inter-institutional recruitment office (to which the Commission answers in
court).204 They were published in full in English, French, and German
only.205 A summary notice appeared in other language versions of the
Official Journal, referring candidates to the full version.206 The notices also
indicated that candidates had to choose a second language for certain tests,
and that the language had to be English, French, or German.207 To ensure
equal treatment, all candidates had to do these tests in their second language,
including those whose first language was one of the three.208 The Spanish
cases concern only the publication regime, whereas the Italian government
also attacked the substantive language requirements.209 In particular, Italy
and Spain alleged infringement of Articles 12, 253, and 290 of the EC (now
18, 296, and 340 TFEU), of Regulation 1/58, and of the principles of nondiscrimination and multilinguism.210 All of these arguments were rejected by
the CFI.211 However, Italy has now appealed to the ECJ.212 The CFI’s
judgments are in many respects similar to that in Case T-185/05, Italy v.
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Joined Cases T-156/07 & T-232/07, Spain v. Comm’n, judgment of 13 September 2010,
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This choice reflected two considerations: on the one hand, the Commission has a longstanding internal practice that documents for decision must be submitted to the Commission
itself in these three languages. On the other hand, EPSO’s own observations of the last
competitions carried out under the previous language regime (in which candidates could have
any official languages as their “first” language and a satisfactory knowledge of any other)
were that, despite the free choice of second language, over 90% of candidates from the fifteen
pre-2004 Member States had chosen either English, French, or German.
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Commission, to which the CFI makes frequent reference.213 It dismisses the
argument based on Article 290 EC (Article 342 TFEU) and Regulation 1/58,
citing Kik, Bonaiti Brighina, and Case T-185/05, Italy v. Commission.214 The
cases confirm: (i) that there is no rule or principle of Community law
requiring competition notices to be published in the Official Journal in all
languages;215 (ii) that there is no principle that all citizens must always
receive all communications from the institutions in their official language;216
(iii) that relations between the institutions and their staff (and candidates217)
fall exclusively under the SR;218 (iv) that in any case, Article 290 EC (Article
342 TFEU) is not an autonomous rule, but is merely the legal basis for
Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 which expressly permits internal language
regimes.219 The GC then removes the ambiguity left by Case T-185/05, Italy
v. Commission, by making it quite clear that it is acceptable in a competition
like this one to publish a notice in full only in some languages, with a shortform notice in others.220 This does not lead to any discrimination concerning
the opportunity to take part, since everyone has the same possibility of being
informed about the existence of the competition.221 In any case, the method
of publication was justified by the link with the content of the competition:
there would be no point in requiring publication in full in all the languages,
since candidates who did not have sufficient knowledge of English, French,
or German to understand the notice would not meet the conditions for
admission.222 The CFI repeats the formula used in Case T-185/05, Italy v.
Commission, that the institutions are free to impose stricter language
213

Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 50; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 52.
Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 89; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 136.
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Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 86–89; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras.
91–92.
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Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 86–89; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras.
91–92.
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Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 56; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 54.
The justification being that they are not communicating with the Institution like other citizens,
but exclusively in order to obtain a post as an official, which presupposes certain language
skills which may thus be required in the notice.
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Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 56; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 54.
219
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41, 52–57, 72–73.
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Case T-117/08, discussed infra Part VI.C.5.
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Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 65, 74; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para.
81.
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requirements than the minima referred to in Article 28(f) whenever the needs
of the post so require or simply those “of the service,” thus exempting the
institution from any obligation to justify the requirements post by post.223
This would be difficult for a reserve list competition because, unlike a
vacancy notice, it is not directed at particular posts but to those that might
become vacant over a given period. The GC also repeats and develops the
Bonaiti Brighina ruling.224 It seems to be simply part of the inherent power
to organize the work of the institution:
It is true, as the Kingdom of Spain argues, that there is no
written rule of Community law indicating that German, English
and French are the internal languages of the Commission and
of other Community Institutions or bodies. However, a
Community Institution or body can choose one or more
languages for internal purposes, provided that that choice is
based on objective considerations, related to the specific
functional requirements of the Institution or body concerned,
taking account, in particular, of the diversity of the staff it
recruits. The use of several languages inside the services of the
institution or body concerned can indeed require knowledge of
one of these working languages. In such a case, however, it
would appear to be sufficient to require knowledge of only one
of these languages. A requirement to have a cumulative
knowledge of various languages cannot be justified by the need
for internal communication . . . .225
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Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 65; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 81.
See Case T-118/99, Bonaiti Brighina v. Comm’n, 2001 E.C.R. II-97 (noting that the
institutions are free to determine their own internal language regime even without adopting a
formal act for this purpose).
225
See Opinion of AG Poiares Maduro, supra note 139. Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203,
para. 75; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, paras. 56, 93–94, 102. This seems to be a retreat
from its position in Hendrickx v. Council, where it accepted a requirement to know two
internal languages. See Case T-376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, 2005 E.C.R. II-379, para. 44.
This might simply reflect the fact that in these competitions, the requirement was to take
exams in one of the second languages (English, French, or German) but not to know two of
the languages. In Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 94. The Court gives greater
emphasis than in Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, to the need to avoid any factual
discrimination among Union citizens in access to Union jobs. On the other hand, the Court
adds a reference to criteria which might help determine what the objective needs of the
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This seems to be confirmed by the rejection of the argument that the
choice of the three languages required to be reasoned in the competition
notice. No such reasoning is required, the CFI says, where it is clear that the
choice reflects the institution’s internal needs.226 In the judgment in Case T166/07, the GC also confirms what it already said in Case T-185/05 Italy v.
Commission that the applicant must demonstrate that the choice of languages
was not proportionate or appropriate. Here, Italy had not done so.227 The
CFI also emphasized the lack of discriminatory effect, since (a) the
requirement was only to know one of the three second languages and (b) the
fact that the “first” language could be any official Union language
guaranteed appropriate diversity of access.228
3. Marcuccio v. Commission229
This case is essentially a repetition, first by the CST, then by the GC, of
the principles confirmed in Rudolph, Rasmussen, and Case T-185/05, Italy v.
Commission: unlike other Union citizens, an official (or former official, in
this case) cannot write to an institution, in a matter connected with his or her
employment, in his or her own language and insist on a reply in that
language. Relations between institutions and officials or agents are not
covered by the language rules in the TEU and the TFEU, the CFR, or by
Regulation 1/58.230 Indeed, to require the institutions to apply these rules in
relations with officials would impose an intolerable burden on them.231 If an
institution sends an official a document in one of its working languages, it is
only required to provide a translation if the official does not have sufficient
knowledge of the language to take note of the document’s contents.232
Interestingly, the CST, influenced by the applicant’s record of ill-considered
litigation, held that these matters were so obvious that the case was

institution might be, such as its history, where it has its seat, the nature of its duties, and the
needs of internal communication. Id.
226
Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 88; Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 126.
227
Italy v. Comm’n, supra note 203, para. 99.
228
Id. paras. 97, 101.
229
Cases F-3/08 and T-515/09 P, Marcuccio v. Comm’n, Orders of the CST of 7 October
2009 and of the General Court of 18 October 2010, not yet reported.
230
Id. paras. 45–54.
231
Id. para. 31, quoting Joined Cases F-51/05 and F-18/06, Duyster v. Comm’n, paras. 58–
59, not yet reported.
232
Id. paras. 45–47.
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vexatious.233 Thus, the applicant should be ordered to pay certain court costs
as well as the Commission’s costs.234
4. Italy v. Commission235
This case concerned not a competition for recruitment of officials (for
which there is an obligation under Annex III of the Staff Regulations to
publish the competition notice in the Official Journal), but a “call for
expressions of interest” (CEI) for a selection procedure for contract agents, a
new category of temporary staff employed under contracts. Articles 79 and
following of the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants (CEOS) do
not lay down any requirements as to publication. Italy attacked two aspects
of the CEI: (i) the fact that it was only published in three languages (English,
French, and German) and (ii) the fact that while candidates could have any
Union language as their “main” language, they had to undergo part of the
tests in a second language, which had to be different from their main
language236 and had to be chosen from among the three languages just
mentioned.
In this case, the information about the selection procedure was published
on the website of the European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO), which
only functioned in three languages. The Commission, which defends EPSO's
decisions in court, argued that the situation was not the same as that which
had led to the annulment of the vacancy notice in Case T-185/05. In that
case, the notice had been published in the Official Journal, but only in three
language versions, so that a reader whose own language was not one of these
three, but who did meet the language conditions for the job might
nevertheless miss the notice if he or she read the Official Journal in his or her
own language. In the present case, the Commission argued, there was no
discrimination in access to the information, since it was only available on the
website. Everyone thus had the same chance of discovering it, whatever
their own language.

233

Case F-3/08, paras. 41–44.
Id.
235
Case T-205/07, Italy v. Comm’n, Judgment of the General Court of 3 February 2011, not
yet reported.
236
This requirement ensured that there was no discrimination in favor of those whose main
language was one of the three. These candidates had to choose one or the other two languages
as their second language to ensure that all candidates were in the same position (i.e., all had to
do the tests in their declared second language, chosen from among the three).
234
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The Court did not agree however, and annulled the notice. It was careful
to limit the ground of annulment to the question of publication; it expressly
confirmed its decision in Case T-185/05 that knowledge of particular
languages can always legitimately be required in the interest of the service.237
On the other hand, there was a risk of unequal treatment arising from the fact
that the notice was only available in full in three languages, and that no other
measures had been adopted to ensure that candidates whose main language
was not one of the three had an equal chance of discovering the notice.238
The case thus shows the General Court maintaining the distinction
between a pragmatic approach to language conditions for recruitment (as in
Cases T-185/05 and T-166/07) and a strict approach to the manner of
publishing notices of competitions and selection procedures (as in T-185/05).
5. Italy v. ESC239
This case is similar in certain respects to Case T-185/07: it also concerned
a vacancy notice for a specific job (in this case an internal notice addressed
only to candidates who were already officials or other servants of the Union),
not a competition to draw up a reserve list for jobs which might become
vacant in the future. As in Case T-185/07, the GC annuls the vacancy notice
for reasons exclusively connected with the publication.
The form of publication was similar to that in Cases T-166 and T-285/07,
described above in relation to that case. The notice was thus published in
full in only three language editions of the Official Journal (English, French,
and German), with a short-form publication in other language versions
referring readers to this full publication. However, there was a small but
significant difference between the facts of that case and those of this one, and
the judgment turned on it.
The difference was that in Cases T-166 and T-285/07, the method of
publication reflected the language conditions for taking part in the
competition, in which candidates had to do certain tests in their declared
“second language,” which had to be one of these three languages. As
explained above, the GC concluded that there was no risk of discrimination
among candidates since: (a) everyone had the same opportunity to discover
the existence of the competition and (b) in any case, anyone who could not
237

T-117/08, Italy v. ESC, Judgment of the General Court of 31 March 2011, not yet
reported, para. 57.
238
Id. paras. 58–63.
239
Id.
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understand the notice in one of these languages was not eligible to apply in
any case.
In Case T-117/08, there was no absolute requirement to undergo tests in a
particular language. Instead:
Under the heading “Qualifications and skills”, the contested
vacancy notice stated, inter alia, the requirement of “[being an
e]stablished official or temporary member of the staff of a
European institution, body, office or agency” and of having a
“[t]horough knowledge of an official language of the European
Union and [an] excellent knowledge of at least two other
official languages of the European Union”, specifying that
“[f]or operational reasons, a good knowledge of English and/or
French [was] highly desirable.”240
The GC confirmed its statements in earlier cases that Regulation 1/58
does not apply to vacancy notices,241 which concern the requirements
institutions impose on their own staff. Those are internal matters, to which a
more flexible linguistic regime applies, the criterion being the interest of the
service.242 The GC even confirmed that there was no requirement to publish
vacancy notices systematically in all languages. Notices could be published
only in certain languages if appropriate steps were taken to inform all
potentially interested parties of the existence of the vacancy.243 However,
confirming earlier statements to the same effect: “although the administration
is entitled to adopt measures which appear to it to be appropriate in order to
govern certain aspects of the procedure for recruiting staff, those measures
must not result in discrimination on grounds of language between the
candidates for a specific post.”244
In this particular case, there was a risk of such discrimination because:
publication of the text of the contested vacancy notice in the
Official Journal in only some official languages, when persons
who have a knowledge only of other official languages are
entitled to submit an application, is likely, in the absence of
240
241
242
243
244

Id. para. 7.
Id. para. 41.
Id. paras. 52–56.
Id. paras. 70, 74.
Id. para. 72.
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other measures to enable that category of potential candidates
duly to acquaint themselves with the content of that notice, to
result in discrimination against them.
In that situation, the candidates in question would be in a less
advantageous position in relation to the other candidates, since
they would not be in a position duly to acquaint themselves
with the qualifications required by the vacancy notice and the
conditions and procedural rules for recruitment. That is a
prerequisite for submitting an application in the best way, to
maximise their chances of being accepted for the post
concerned [see, by analogy, Italy v. Commission, paragraph
136].
In the present case, it is apparent from the provisions of point
3 of the contested vacancy notice, as cited in paragraph 7
above, that knowledge of English and/or French is only “highly
desirable” and not required. Potential candidates for the post of
Secretary-General of the EESC, having a thorough knowledge
of one official language and an excellent knowledge of at least
two other official languages, other than one of the three
languages of publication, were therefore eligible to apply and
could thus have applied for that post if the vacancy notice had
been published in a language which they knew and if they had
thus been informed that the vacancy existed.
Moreover, even candidates who have a satisfactory
knowledge of English, French or German do not necessarily
look at the editions of the Official Journal in one of those three
languages, but consult the edition in their own language [Italy
v. Commission, paragraph 148].
There is therefore a significant risk that candidates
potentially interested in the contested vacancy notice consulted
only the notices published in all official languages, that is to
say, the shortened notice of 28 December 2007, merely
referring to the publication in the Official Journal of the
contested vacancy notice . . . .245
This reasoning is narrower than that in Cases T-166 and T-285/07. In that
case, the GC accepted the same publication regime for two reasons,
245

Id. paras. 78–82.
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summarised at (a) and (b) above. Under the reasoning in Case T-117/08, it is
not accepted that this form of publication allows everyone the same access to
the information as to the existence of the notice, which was reason (a) in the
earlier case. Instead, only reason (b) can now justify this form of
publication, i.e., there is a link between the method of publication and the
language requirements of the post.
A reader might wonder about the practical consequences of the
annulments in some of the cases brought by Member States. If the vacancy
notice or the call for expressions of interest was annulled, what about the
people who had been appointed on the basis of the procedure which had been
advertised? The correct view is that their rights are not affected: they are
innocent third parties who are not responsible for the illegality of the notice,
which moreover has only been revealed months or years after the recruitment
procedure has been completed. In such a situation it would be excessive to
consider that the illegality attaching to the notice fed through to the
individual appointments, which are independent decisions.246
6. Angioi v. Commission247
In this case, an individual candidate attacked the three-language regime
described above, in connection with her exclusion from a selection procedure
for contract agents. She did not put forward the argument about the manner
of publication of the notice which succeeded in Case T-205/07.248 Instead,
she argued about the justification of the language conditions of the tests
themselves. She put forward a number of arguments, of which only one was
of general importance. She argued that (a) a requirement to know a
particular language can only be justified in relation to a specific post, and
246

This is exactly the reasoning followed by the Union courts in relation to other cases
where individual decisions rejecting candidates were based on a condition in a
competitionnotice late found to be unlawful. The Courts consider that the appointments of
other candidates based on the notice should not be disturbed since they may have occurred
some considerable time before the finding of illegality and in any case, the persons concerned
are innocent bystanders, who are not responsible for the illegality of the notice, whereas all
that is required is to find an appropriate way of giving effect to the annulment for the benefit
of those who have obtained it. See e.g. Case C-242/90, Commission v Albani, 1991 E.C.R. I3839, paras. 13–17 (determining that the proportionate solution is thus to allow the applicants
who have obtained the annulment to sit new tests of comparable difficulty to those in the
original competition).
247
Case F-7/07, Angioi v. Comm’n, Judgment of 29 June 2011, not yet reported.
248
The notice was not the same as Case T-205/07, though the method of publication was the
same. See supra note 235.
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cannot be imposed generally in a procedure designed only to draw up a
reserve list and that there was no evidence that a knowledge of English,
French, or German was essential for all contract agent posts; and (b) that
Regulation 1/58 applied, and that even if Article 6 allowed the institutions to
adopt simplified language practices for internal purposes, there was no
evidence any of them had adopted any decision to that effect, or indeed that
these three languages were the most commonly used in the institutions.249
This is a judgment of the full CST, which has not been appealed. The
CST essentially follows the reasoning of the GC in Cases T-166 and T285/07. In particular, it accepts that specific language requirements can be
justified not only in relation to particular posts, but can be imposed more
generally, given:
the existence, within the institution, of one or more languages
of internal communication. Since an institution has the right,
even without taking a formal decision to that effect, to choose a
limited number of languages of internal communication,
provided that that choice is based on objective considerations
relating to its operational needs [see, to that effect, Opinion of
Advocate
General
Poiares
Maduro
in
Case
C-160/03 Spain v. Eurojust, points 49 and 56; Spain v.
Commission, paragraph 75; and Italy v. Commission, paragraph
93]. It follows that that institution may legitimately impose on
contract staff whom it intends to recruit a knowledge of
languages
matching
those
languages
of
internal
communication. Otherwise it would be exposed to the risk of
employing a staff member who was unable adequately to
perform his duties within the institution, since that staff
member would be put in a position, in some circumstances,
where he was unable, or found it extremely difficult, to
communicate with his work colleagues and to understand the
instructions issued by his hierarchical superiors. In that regard,
it must be pointed out that, in the judgment
in Italy v. Commission, given in a case where EPSO had
published competition notices for the purpose of establishing
reserve lists intended to fill vacancies for administrators and
assistants within the European institutions, the General Court
249

See summary of arguments Case F-7/07, Angioi v. Comm’n, paras. 78–80.
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accepted not only that the choice of English, French and
German corresponded to the operational needs of the
institutions and bodies of the European Union, but also that
EPSO had been properly entitled to require the candidates in
those competitions to have a knowledge, as their second
language, of one of those three languages [Italy v. Commission,
paragraph 103].250
The CST, like the GC, recognizes that language requirements must avoid
creating discrimination between candidates. It therefore subjects the
requirements in the instant case to a double test—they must pursue a
legitimate objective and there must be a “reasonable relationship of
proportionality” between the requirements and that objective.251
The requirements in this case passed these tests, since there was evidence
in the file that “English, French and German are, in varying degrees, used as
the languages of internal communication within the institutions which are
likely to recruit a significant proportion of the candidates who pass the
selection tests, namely the Commission and the Council.”252 Therefore: “the
language requirements set out in the [notice] pursued a legitimate objective
in the general interest in the framework of staff policy, namely to ensure that
those members of staff had a knowledge of languages matching those
languages of internal communication.”253
The proportionality test was also met, since the notice only required
candidates to know one of the three languages as a second language, which is
all that is required to ensure internal communication inside an institution
which uses any of two or three languages internally (a requirement to know
two, or all three, would be disproportionate in such a case and would amount
to granting a privileged status to certain languages).254
Nor did the regime chosen involve discrimination. It was true that
candidates who had one of the three languages as their main language then
found their choice of a second language limited to two, whereas other
candidates, whose main language was not one of the three, had a choice from

250
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252
253
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Id. paras. 94–95.
Id.
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three. However, this could not be criticised since it was simply a matter of
personal circumstances.255
The CST concludes on this point with certain general remarks:
Moreover, in the context of the internal functioning of the
European Union institutions, the choice of language of internal
communication is the responsibility of those institutions which
have the power to impose it on their staff. As provided in
Article 6 of Regulation No 1 – which was adopted by the
Council under the Treaty provisions conferring on it
competence to adopt the rules governing the languages of the
institutions of the European Union –, the “institutions . . . may
stipulate in their rules of procedure which of the languages are
to be used in specific cases.” Accordingly, contrary to what the
Kingdom of Spain and the Italian Republic maintain, EPSO
was properly entitled to limit the choice of second language to
English, French or German, as it did in the CEI, which had
been launched “on behalf of the European Institutions and of
the Commission and the Council in particular.”
The argument that EPSO should, in the CEI, have justified
the choice of the three languages to be used in order to
participate in the pre-selection tests must also be rejected, since
it is common ground that that choice reflected the internal
requirements of the institutions.256
A concluding point concerns the possible relevance of statistics in order
to verify the supposed discriminatory effects of a system in which candidates
are required to have knowledge of certain official languages. In Eurojust,
the Advocate-General looked at the statistical evidence and it helped him
conclude that there was no reason to criticize what had been done, save as to
one post.257 However, the Courts have not yet found it necessary to
pronounce on the point, although such evidence was available in Case T156/07, Spain v. Commission, concerning the number of applications broken
down by nationality.258 This evidence appeared to confirm that there had
been no effect of favoring native speakers of English, French, or German.
255
256
257
258
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Spain v. Comm’n, supra note 203.
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D. Pending Cases
It remains to mention the cases still pending. In the GC there are:
(1) Case T-142/08, Italy v. Commission, concerns Open
Competitions EPSO/AD/116 and 117/08;259
(2) Case T-164/08, Italy v. Commission, is about Open
Competition EPSO/AD/125/08;260
(3) Case T-126/09, Italy v. Commission, concerns Open
Competitions EPSO/AD/144/09, EPSO/AD/145/09 and
EPSO/AD/146/09, which are special post-enlargement
competitions for junior administrators exclusively from the
Member States which joined in 2004 and 2007;261
(4) Case T-218/09, Italy v. Commission, relates to Open
Competitions EPSO/AST/91/09 and EPSO/AST/92/09 for the
recruitment of specialist assistant staff;262
(5) Case T-248/10, Italy v. Commission, is about Open
Competition EPSO/AD/177/10, for junior administrators.263
The most important pending case however is Case C-566/10 P, Italy v.
Commission,264 which is Italy's appeal to the ECJ against the judgment of the
GC in Joined Cases T-166 and T-285/07 (above). The abovementioned GC
cases have been suspended pending judgment on this appeal.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The case law of the GC and the CST reflects the clear distinction made
in Regulation 1/58 between the external and internal language regimes. The
former concerns communication between the institutions and Member States
or between the institutions and citizens, formal acts in particular. This
regime is strict: the institutions must use specific official languages
appropriate to that state or that citizen.
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The institutions, however, recognized from the outset that a different and
more flexible regime was needed for informal internal communication inside
the institutions. Article 6 of Regulation 1/58 thus allows for an internal
language regime to be laid down in each institution’s rules of procedure.265
The institutions have hesitated to make full use of this possibility, no doubt
because formally recognizing that certain official languages are more widely
used than others is seen as problematic. Some institutions, for example, have
adopted rules, but this adoption is only a formality, since the rules are more
or less copies of the external rules of Regulation 1/58 (e.g., Council and
Parliament). On the other hand, regardless of which approach is taken in the
rules of procedure, each institution has certain purely factual language
practices.266 These practices tend to be more visible when the institutions
publish a vacancy notice or a competition notice to recruit staff. The
doubling of the number of official languages since 2004 has made it
necessary to impose knowledge of particular language requirements to
ensure that internal communication is maintained. At the same time,
candidates can have any official language as their first language, which
ensures geographical balance and the possibility of communicating
externally to native-speaker standard in all languages. Publications in the
Official Journal which require candidates to have particular languages and to
pass certain tests in a second language, are chosen from the three languages
considered to be the most widely-spoken. As a result, what could be
tolerated so long as it was simply an internal practice, became intolerable for
some. Once the internal practices became visible in official publications,
certain Member States brought actions against the institutions.
The ECJ has yet to pronounce on these matters—hence the considerable
importance of the future judgment in Case C-566/10 P, Italy v. Commission.
The Court has upheld the need to observe the strict linguistic regime of
Regulation 1/58 in Skoma-Lux.267 Legislation is only enforceable against
citizens in a given Member State when it is published in the language which
the Union recognizes as official with respect to that state.268 The Court has
also dealt with an intermediate situation in Kik, namely where the
relationship between the institution and the citizen is of what may be called a
265
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commercial nature, such as granting an intellectual property right against
payment.269 Here, it recognizes that the Union legislature may validly adopt
a limited language regime, to take account of the various interests potentially
involved.270 Only now, however, is the Court confronted with the question
already considered several times by the CFI/GC and the CST, of whether
internal language practices of an institution can justify the published
requirement to know particular official languages.271 The requirement
appears not in a binding legislative text but in a purely informative text,
namely a competition notice, which is simply an invitation to apply if one so
wishes.272 Eurojust seemed to provide the opportunity for dealing with the
point, and the Advocate-General was prepared to recognize that such
requirements can be justified, but the institution must be prepared (he says)
to provide a concrete justification—a requirement, by the way, which the
CFI/GC case law has not expressly imposed.273 The Court did not answer
the question in Eurojust, given the particular features of that organization
which, the Court held, meant that vacancy notices could not be attacked by a
Member State.274 These features are not present in Case C-566/10 P, Italy v.
Commission.275 The judgment is thus awaited with considerable interest.
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